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We examine deviations between the prices and values of binary options listed on Tradesports.com, an
online prediction market. Our analysis shows that NFL sides contracts are overpriced on average,
indicating that this market may be characterized by a shortage of sellers. We also find that overpricing
is more pronounced immediately after information shocks occur, especially when the news is
negative. Additionally, while prior research suggests that differences between asset prices and values
should be symmetric around the market-price-midpoint of $50, we find that this divergence is instead
larger for low-priced contracts. Finally, we demonstrate that a simple rule designed to exploit the
identified biases enables a highly profitable trading strategy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The size and importance of prediction markets have grown rapidly
throughout the past decade. In particular, public exchanges such as the Iowa
Electronic Markets (IEM) and Tradesports have received much attention from
researchers and politicians alike. In general, studies show these markets to be
effective information aggregators and event predictors. For instance, Berg,
Nelson, and Rietz (2003) show that the IEM project, a real-money online
exchange in which participants wager on the outcomes of political events, is
an extremely precise forecaster of election results. Not only has the IEM
consistently outperformed opinion polls in accuracy (Berg, Nelson, and Rietz,
2000), but similar exchanges perform well even when play money is used
(Servan-Schreiber, Wolfers, Pennock, and Galebach, 2004).
Another exampleof the reliabilityofpublicpredictionmarkets is the accuracy
of wagers on box office revenues and Hollywood award winners (Pennock,
Lawrence, Giles, andNielsen, 2001). Furthermore, private betting exchanges can
be valuable tools in corporate settings. For example, Chen and Plott (2002) show
that an intra-firm exchange can accurately forecast future equipment sales, while
Ortner (1998) provides evidence that a within-firm prediction market is useful at
estimating the likelihood of meeting project deadlines.
Public exchanges such as Tradesports are valuable settings in which to test
trader behavior, as one can compare clearly observable outcomes to market
expectations for a wide variety of events. Because the true value of each
prediction market asset is revealed with certainty upon contract expiry, the
joint hypothesis problem is mitigated. In addition, expectations can be readily
quantified because, as Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005b) demonstrate, prediction
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market prices approximate the central tendency of the distribution of trader
beliefs. Therefore, in markets where contracts expire at either $0 or $100, the
price (in dollars) that a trader is willing to pay for a contract is expected to
equal her subjective estimate of the probability (in percent) that contract will
expire at $100.
So, if prediction markets are efficient, a plot of contract prices vs. realized
win rates should approximate a 458 line (a ‘win’ is to be defined as expiry at
$100). In studying a variety of exchanges, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005c) find
that market prices rapidly respond to new information and that few arbitrage
opportunities exist. However, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005a) also show that
observed win rates of contracts traded on the IEM differ from expectations
within certain price bands. Thus, it remains an open question whether
prediction markets are efficient.
This study is one of the first to examine the within-game financial-market-
style of betting that occurs on Tradesports, a setting that may be particularly
useful at revealing traderpreferences and illustratingapotential framingproblem
associatedwith short sales. The contracts considered represent bets on outcomes
of National Football League (NFL) games. But, unlike traditional gambling
markets which prohibit betting after an underlying event begins, Tradesports
allows participants to place bets at any point before game outcomes are decided.
Furthermore, because each NFL game is broadcast live via a variety of
media, all traders gain simultaneous access to an identical set ofnews innovations
(within-game scores) as they transpire. Thus, the Tradesports exchange provides
a unique opportunity to quantify how quickly and accurately markets respond to
information shocks. For instance, we can examine whether traders react
efficiently to the news that a teamhas scored a touchdownby comparing contract
prices to underlying asset values following such occurrences.
We demonstrate that asset values (measured by mean expiry payouts)
differ significantly from prices only between kickoff and contract expiry,
a period during which significant news arrives relatively rapidly. Additionally,
while the divergence between values and prices is predicted to be symmetric
around $50, we find evidence suggesting that they deviate furthest from each
other when prices are between $20 and $60. We then show that assets are more
likely to be overpriced immediately after information shocks arrive, and
propose a set of trading rules to exploit these price biases.
Our findings are potentially interesting because widespread participation
in prediction markets is a relatively new phenomenon, and many fundamental
questions remain unanswered. Section II describes the data used in this study.
Section III provides an analysis of the data and results, and concluding
remarks are presented in Section IV.
II. DATA
The online exchange operated by Tradesports.com is a continuous double
auction in which traders can place market and limit orders. All assets are
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binary options with prices ranging from $0 to $100 for a 10-contract lot
(henceforth a ‘contract’), and the expiry value of each contract is either $0
(henceforth a ‘loss’) or $100 (henceforth a ‘win’). Contract expiry values
depend upon the outcomes of various underlying events such as equity price
movements, election results, or sporting event scores. For instance,
Tradesports recently listed a contract titled ‘DOW.22JUNE.-100.’
The contract expires at $100 if the Dow Jones Industrial Average decreases
by more than 100 points on June 22, and at $0 otherwise.
Our dataset consists of execution times, prices, and quantities detailing
336,299 trades of sides contracts associated with 999 preseason, regular
season, and postseason football games from the 2002, 2003, and 2004 NFL
seasons.2 During this period, total wealth wagered across all Tradesports NFL
sides contracts was $31,400,000, and the exchange charged a commission of
$0.40 per contract upon trade execution and expiry.
Sportsnetwork, a provider of streaming sports information, employs
observers to monitor live game feeds of all NFL games and to log play-by-
play information such as down, distance, yards gained, penalties, etc. On all
scoring plays, an observer immediately enters an initial log that briefly states
which team has scored, and this data is automatically stamped with a date and
time. For instance, the text keyed into the log might be ‘NY Giants TD,’ and
the system records the event as ‘09/05 22:17:23 ET NY Giants Touchdown –
Details to follow.’ A subsequent entry would contain additional descriptive
information such as the number of yards gained on the scoring play and the
name(s) of the player(s) involved.
To match the arrival of news innovations with corresponding fluctuations
of market price, we supplement our contract dataset with Sportsnetwork’s logs
describing the 4,599 touchdowns scored in the NFL from the 2002 through
2004 seasons. While NFL restrictions prevent immediate dissemination of
game information, all events are logged into Sportsnetwork’s database and
time stamped within seconds of occurring. Sportsnetwork’s Director of
Operations estimates that, on average, the amount of time that passes between
the time that an NFL score occurs and the time that the initial log is recorded is
approximately five seconds, while the maximum delay is 15 seconds. For all
analyses in this study, we use the initial log time stamps to match game events
with corresponding trades.
III. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
In exploring the relationship between prices and values, we begin by
plotting execution prices (grouped into bands $2.50 wide) against observed
win rates for contracts bought or sold on Tradesports before kickoff, the point
at which underlying events become active. If this market were perfectly
efficient, then we should observe that contracts purchased at a price of $P win
at a rate not different from P% on average.
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The relationship emerging from our data is contrasted against the
458efficiency line in Figure 1, and error bars indicate 95% confidence limits
after adjusting standard errors for the effects of clustering (Woodruff, 1971).3
While test power is limited due to relatively thin trading, in the five-day period
prior to kickoff we find little evidence that contract win rates systematically
deviate from prices. This result differs from that documented for the IEM
political exchange, where Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005a) show that contract
win rates deviate from expectations in a quasi-sinusoidal fashion, and are
significantly lower (higher) than expected around $25 ($75).
Figure 2 illustrates that once underlying events become active (upon
kickoff), prices deviate from values in a manner similar to that demonstrated
on the IEM. But, unlike IEM contracts, NFL contracts expire at $100 less
frequently than expected on average. The mean observed price movement
from purchase to expiry for contracts traded while associated games are
underway is 24.54 ticks with a standard error of 1.76 ticks, where a tick is
equivalent to $1. This result does not obtain when we examine only trades
executed before kickoff (mean ¼ 21.39 ticks; standard error ¼ 1.87 ticks).
The difference between these two means is significant (p-Value ¼ 0.0182),
suggesting that there are important dissimilarities between pre-event and
within-event market dynamics.
The primary differences between these two distinct trading periods are the
rate of information flow and the significance of arriving news packets.
The flow rate is potentially important because information (and thus price)
moves slowly before underlying events begin, so traders may be able to
engage in cross-exchange arbitrage operations (via other Internet sites or
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FIGURE 1. Pre-kickoff contract prices and win rates. This plot is generated from 119,735 NFL contract
trades occurring in the five-day span before kickoff. Each data point represents the observed mean win rate
of bets placed at each price level (grouped into $2.50 bands). A win is defined as expiry at $100. Error bars
indicate 95% confidence limits after adjusting standard errors for the effects of clustering.
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traditional sports books). Alternatively, the extra time elapsing between
consecutive pre-kickoff news events may provide participants with a superior
opportunity to reevaluate prior beliefs, and thus more accurately estimate
asset value. News importance also varies because, before kickoff, any arriving
information is likely to be a less meaningful signal concerning game outcome
than would be a within-game touchdown.4 We next further explore the
systematic price biases that emerge after kickoff.
A. Utility maximization
As discussed in Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005b), the quasi-sinusoidal
pattern appearing in Figure 2 may be a product of exchange structure. For
prediction markets having a $0 to $100 asset pricing format, and for constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) between 0 and 1, an equilibrium occurs in
which price is between the market’s mean subjective valuation and $50.
The result is that contracts costing less (more) than $50 may be overpriced
(underpriced). To illustrate the general case, suppose that agents have CRRA
utility function u(x) ¼ x a and that the price of asset A is p. If agent i with
wealth wi has belief bi that event A will occur, then her expected utility is:
E½uðqiÞ ¼ biðwi þ ð12 pÞqiÞa þ ð12 biÞðwi 2 pqiÞa;ð1Þ
where qi is the quantity of asset A purchased by agent i. The optimal bet size qi
is the solution to:
›E
›q
¼ bi½aðwi þ ð12 pÞqiÞa21ð12 pÞ þ ð12 biÞ½aðwi 2 pqiÞa21ð2pÞ ¼ 0:ð2Þ
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FIGURE 2. Post-kickoff contract prices and win rates. This plot is generated from 216,564 NFL contract
trades occurring after kickoff. Each data point represents the observed mean win rate of contracts purchased
at each price level (grouped into $2.50 bands). A win is defined as expiry at $100. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence limits after adjusting standard errors for the effects of clustering.
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Solving, we obtain:
qi ¼ b
ð12aÞ21
i ð12 pÞð12aÞ
21
2 ð12 biÞð12aÞ21p ð12aÞ21
bð12aÞ
21
i ð12 pÞð12aÞ
21
pþ ð12 biÞð12aÞ21p ð12aÞ21ð12 pÞ
wi:ð3Þ
This expression reveals that when agents’ beliefs diverge, supply may not
equal demand. For instance, if agent 1 has belief b1 ¼ 0.3 that event A will
ocdcur, then her asset demand at p ¼ 0.40 is q1(0.3) ¼ 20.767w1. If agent 2
has belief b2 ¼ 0.5 that event A will occur, then her asset demand at p ¼ 0.40
is q2(0.5) ¼ 0.833w2. Thus, the price of asset A needs to rise if supply is to
equal demand, so the equilibrium price in this case will be above the mean of
the agents’ beliefs. Figure 3 depicts the resulting supply and demand at all
prices when the mean of the agents’ beliefs is 0.40. We next offer a
generalized example to show why prices may differ from expected values
within particular price bands on the Tradesports exchange.
To illustrate the expected excess demand at all price levels when agents’
beliefs differ, suppose that Tradesports agent 1 is pessimistic (b1 ¼ p 2 0.10)
and Tradesports agent 2 is optimistic (b2 ¼ p þ 0.10). Here, p is the true
probability of an event occurring and is equal toPrice/$100. Figure 4 shows the
expected supply, demand, and excess demand on the Tradesports exchange at
each price level in the presence of pessimistic agent 1 and optimistic agent 2.
For example, if each agent’s wealth is $100 and the market price is $40, then
agent 1 iswilling to supply 1.92 contractswhile agent 2 demands 2.08 contracts.
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FIGURE 3. Expected demand for prediction market contracts. This plot illustrates the differences between
supply and demand under a CRRA utility model with u(x) ¼ x 0.5 when price ¼ 0.40, the beliefs of two
agents are b1 ¼ 0.30 and b2 ¼ 0.50, and each agent i has wealth wi ¼ 1.
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Thus, the market is characterized by a supply shortage and contracts
purchased at $40 are overpriced (themeanwin rate is below p). Importantly, the
resulting plot illustrates that the imbalance between supply and demand (the
solid curve) under the CRRA model should be symmetric around $50, and is
expected to be greatest when prices diverge furthest from$50.We next contrast
the predictions of this model with observed price behavior on the Tradesports
NFL exchange when underlying events are active, a period in which market
participants face the rapid arrival of significant news innovations.
B. Asset mispricing
Selecting the appropriate metric to quantify post-score price movements
is imperative. Rather than attempt to establish a baseline asset price at t ¼ 0
(the moment that the score is realized), we choose measure the amount of
price movement from trade execution to contract expiry. There are several
reasons for this decision. The prices of transactions occurring just prior to
t ¼ 0 would not provide a meaningful baseline because important information
has yet to be revealed. Utilizing the price of the first post-score trade as the
baseline would also be problematic because several minutes sometimes pass
before this first trade occurs, thus stale prices become an obstacle.
Furthermore, as we later demonstrate, price tend to drift downwards after
t ¼ 0 so using an average of post-score prices over the t minutes following
each score would be problematic. The metric Returns to Expirywould again be
suboptimal because all contracts that expire at $0 would have return rates of
2100%, and return rates of contracts that expire at $100 would be positively
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FIGURE 4. Expected excess demand for contracts on tradesports. This plot illustrates the predicted
differences between supply and demand under a CRRA utility model with u(x) ¼ x 0.5. The probability of an
event occurring is p ¼ Price/$100, pessimistic agent 1 has belief b1 ¼ p–0.10, optimistic agent 2 has belief
b2 ¼ p þ 0.10, and each agent i has wealth wi ¼ $100. Quantity is expressed as the number of 10-contract
lots supplied and demanded at each price level.
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skewed. To circumvent these difficulties, we choose to use the metric Ticks to
Expirywhich is the difference between the expiry and execution prices of each
contract.
As shown in Figure 2, assets that are priced far below (above) $50 win less
(more) often than expected. This is consistent with the utility maximization
model presented above. However, the plot in Figure 2 is not symmetric around
$50, and assetswithin the band$50 to$60appear to be overpriced. Furthermore,
the win rates for all NFL contracts are too low on average, as mean Ticks to
Expiry is24.54,which is significantlydifferent fromzero (p-Value ¼ 0.0099).
None of the latter three characteristics is true of assets traded on the IEM
exchange, nor predicted by the utility maximization model. These unexpected
findings can potentially be explained by the framing of Tradesports contracts,
gambler preferences, and structural differences between the assets in prediction
markets and those in traditional casino-type betting markets.
Each NFL contract listed on Tradesports is framed with respect to the
favorite, and prior research shows that unsophisticated football bettors prefer to
take the stronger team when betting against the spread (Levitt, 2004).
Additionally, as sports prediction markets are relatively new, it is reasonable to
believe thatmost traders using theTradesportsNFLexchange are accustomed to
traditional bettingmarkets (e.g., casino sports books and illegal bookmakers).As
such, the vast majority of traders are experienced (inexperienced) in buying
(selling) bets. Furthermore, selling a bet is less straightforward because onemust
perform a more complex calculation to determine the possible returns.
In traditional markets, gamblers who expect Team A (B) to cover will buy
bets on TeamA (B). On the Tradesports exchange, thosewho expect TeamA to
cover the spread will buy bets on Team A, but those who expect Team B to
covermust sell bets onTeamA. It is plausible that reframing bets in thismanner
causes confusion amongunsophisticated traders and thus creates a reluctance to
sell.5 If this is the case, then the resulting supply suppression would force
contract win rates to fall relative to expectations. In addition, price inefficiency
could sustain while underlying events are active because the high rate of
information flow during this time would make across-online-market arbitrage
problematic. The supply suppression hypothesis would be supported if we find
that prices are most inflated when unsophisticated traders dominate the market.
To better understand the relationship between information flow rates and
price biases, we next briefly examine the Tradesports National Basketball
Association (NBA) exchange. Scores occur more frequently in NBA
basketball games than they do in NFL football games, but each contributes
comparatively little information about contract expiry value. By contrasting
the price/value deviations in these two markets, we hope to infer whether the
magnitude of information shocks is an important determinant of mispricing.
Figure 5 demonstrates that observed NBA contract win rates (the dashed
curve) more closely approximate IEM political contract win rates. That is,
compared to the NFL exchange, the NBA exchange is characterized by
smaller deviations between prices and values, and these deviations are also
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more symmetric around the market-price-midpoint of $50. This result
suggests that the relatively large magnitude of arriving information shocks
may be one source of systematic NFL contract price biases. We next explore
this idea further by focusing our attention on price fluctuations after
touchdowns, events which represent significant news innovations.
In the NFL, the majority of scoring drives span several minutes from
beginning to end. A team typically takes possession of the football relatively far
away from, and attempts tomove into, scoringposition.As the offenseadvances,
the likelihood that the drive will produce a touchdown increases on average.
Aplot of pricemovement in theneighborhoodof a score should therefore exhibit
considerable movement in the minutes just prior to t ¼ 0 as the offense drives
downfield followed by a flat line thereafter once the score occurs. Evenwhen the
opposing team takes possession on the ensuing kickoff, the price should not
move on average since bettors know that this change of possession will occur.
Thus, a price spike would appear at t ¼ 0 only if the event is unexpected.
Figure 6 illustrates the mean win rates for contracts purchased at any point
after a touchdown occurs.6 If the most recent news event was negative
(positive), then it is used to construct plot 6A (6B). We define a negative
(positive) touchdown as one that makes an associated contract less (more)
likely to expire at $100.Contrasting the two plots, post-scoremean contractwin
rates appear depend partly upon the direction (negative vs. positive) of the prior
news event. The mean Ticks to Expiry for all contracts purchased following
negative (positive) touchdowns is26.63 (23.63), each ofwhich is statistically
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FIGURE 5. Win rates of NFL and NBA contracts. This plot is generated from 216,564 (229,627) NFL
(NBA) contract trades occurring after kickoff (tipoff). Each data point represents the observed mean win
rate of contracts purchased at each price level (grouped into $2.50 bands). A win is defined as expiry at
$100.
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different from zero (p-Value ¼ 0.0003 and p-Value ¼ 0.0757, respectively),
and the difference in means is also significant (p-Value ¼ 0.0761).
On the other hand, we find that the mean Ticks to Expiry for contracts
purchased after kickoff but before a touchdown is scored (all transactions that
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FIGURE 6. (A) Contract prices and win rates after negative news events. This plot is generated from 85,810
NFL contract trades occurring after negative news events. A news event is defined to be negative if it makes
the contract less likely to expire at $100. Each data point represents the observed mean win rate of contracts
purchased at each price level (grouped into $2.50 bands). A win is defined as expiry at $100. Error bars
indicate 95% confidence limits after adjusting standard errors for the effects of clustering. (B) Contract
prices and win rates after positive news events. This plot is generated from 100,381 NFL contract trades
occurring after positive news events. A news event is defined to be positive if it makes the contract more
likely to expire at $100. Each data point represents the observed mean win rate of contracts purchased at
each price level (grouped into $2.50 bands). A win is defined as expiry at $100. Error bars indicate 95%
confidence limits after adjusting standard errors for the effects of clustering.
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are not included in 6A or 6B) is 21.67, which is not statistically different
from zero. The mean elapsed time over this period is 28.25 minutes. Findings
thus far indicate that this market is inefficient at incorporating information
into prices but, as we later demonstrate, there are several important
determinants for which we must adjust before drawing conclusions.
To better understand the patterns appearing in Figure 6, we isolate
transactions occurring in the time window around scores. Under the null
hypothesis of market efficiency, we expect to find that the average post-score
price movement of any asset from purchase to expiry is zero. Examining all
transactions occurring less than five minutes after touchdowns, we instead
observe that the mean Ticks to Expiry is 27.10, which is statistically different
from zero (p-Value ¼ 0.0003).
In Figure 7A (7B),we plot themean observedTicks to Expiry and volume for
all trades ineachone-minuteperiodwithin a30-minuteneighborhoodof negative
(positive) touchdowns.7 Contrasting 7A and 7B, evidence shows that the
magnitude of the price/value deviation also depends upon the direction of the
prior news event. The mean Ticks to Expiry for contracts purchased fewer than
fiveminutes after negative (positive) scores is29.47 (24.97), and the difference
between these two means is statistically significant (p-Value ¼ 0.0040).
Each mean is also reliably different from zero (p-Value , 0.0001 and
p-Value ¼ 0.0234, respectively). Because transaction timing appears to be an
important determinant of subsequent price movements, we next divide the data
into within-game subgroups.
To establish whether post-score returns vary from the start to the end of
each underlying event, we calculate mean post-score Ticks to Expiry by game
quarter. Again, only those assets that are traded fewer than five minutes after
touchdowns are included. As shown in Table 1, contracts bought immediately
after negative first-quarter scores are significantly overpriced, but those
bought following positive first-quarter scores are not. The difference in means
is highly significant (mean ¼ 215.28; p-Value ¼ 0.0003). The difference in
means is also statistically significant in the second quarter (mean ¼ 26.53;
p-Value ¼ 0.0271). In the final two quarters, assets purchased immediately
after scores exhibit negative returns to expiry in 16 of 20 of the 24
price/quarter subgroups, but prior score direction is not a significant
determinant of subsequent returns. We also find that whenever the execution
price is between $20 and $60, post-score returns are negative regardless of
quarter.
To formally test for these price biases, we next specify several OLS
models in which the dependent variable is Ticks to Expiry. Initially, we again
include only those trades occurring less than five minutes after scores, but later
extend the cutoff to incorporate all trades executed less than 20 minutes after
scores. Table 2 describes the post-score price movements of the group of
contracts used to produce Table 1 after adjusting for both the elapsed time
since the previous score occurred and total contract volume.
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FIGURE 7. (A) NFL contract price movement after negative scores. This plot is generated from 75,398 NFL
contract trades occurring within the time neighborhood of negative scores. Negative scores are defined to be
those that make a contract less likely to expire at $100. Each data point represents the observed mean Ticks
to Expiry of contracts purchased fewer than 10 minutes before and 20 minutes after negative touchdowns
(grouped into 60-second bands). Ticks to Expiry is calculated by differencing expiry and execution prices.
One tick is equal to $1. Error bars indicate 95% confidence limits after adjusting standard errors for the
effects of clustering. The dashed curve indicates volume expressed as the number of 10-contract lots traded
within each time band. (B) NFL contract price movement after positive scores. This plot is generated from
89,946 NFL contract trades occurring within the time neighborhood of positive scores. Positive scores are
defined to be those that make a contract more likely to expire at $100. Each data point represents the
observed mean Ticks to Expiry of contracts purchased fewer than 10 minutes before and 20 minutes after
negative touchdowns (grouped into 60-second bands). Ticks to Expiry is calculated by differencing expiry
and execution prices. One tick is equal to $1. Error bars indicate 95% confidence limits after adjusting
standard errors for the effects of clustering. The dashed curve indicates volume expressed as the number of
10-contract lots traded within each time band.
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In this model, MSLS is the number of minutes since the last score
occurred. Q1 (Q2, Q3, Q4) is a dummy variable set to 1 when the score occurs
in quarter 1 (2, 3, 4), and to 0 otherwise. Score is the point value of the
observed event [set to26 (6) if the touchdown makes the contract less (more)
likely to expire at $100]. Volume is the demeaned natural log of the number of
10-contract lots traded.8 Each PRICE_X_Y variable is set to 1 whenever the
execution price is greater than $X and less than or equal to $Y, and to 0
TABLE 1
Post-Score Price Movements of NFL Contracts.
First Quarter Second Quarter
Event
Type Price Range Volume
Ticks to
Expiry
p-
Value Volume
Ticks to
Expiry
p-
Value
Negative $0 , P # $20 239 23.96 0.6367 1,135 29.26 0.0000
$20 , P # $40 1,832 219.79 0.0000 2,281 214.40 0.0011
$40 , P # $60 1,926 212.59 0.0155 2,341 213.74 0.0143
$60 , P # $80 558 22.80 0.7160 736 25.95 0.3645
$80 , P , $100 15 24.55 0.8067 240 6.37 0.1308
All 4,570 213.47 0.0002 6,733 211.16 0.0001
Positive $0 , P # $20 0 – – 61 214.61 0.0000
$20 , P # $40 49 26.96 0.5995 584 216.86 0.0106
$40 , P # $60 1,219 26.00 0.3102 1,425 222.92 0.0000
$60 , P # $80 3,344 5.80 0.1473 3,477 20.24 0.9572
$80 , P , $100 987 21.96 0.7503 3,126 4.68 0.0462
All 5,599 1.81 0.5781 8,673 24.63 0.0722
Third Quarter Fourth Quarter
Event
Type
Price Range Volume Ticks to
Expiry
p-
Value
Volume Ticks to
Expiry
p-
Value
Negative $0 , P # $20 1,418 24.33 0.0402 5,261 25.19 0.0000
$20 , P # $40 1,760 29.09 0.1674 2,048 214.22 0.0024
$40 , P # $60 964 210.21 0.2943 625 23.31 0.7079
$60 , P # $80 319 2.69 0.7499 1,137 22.45 0.7906
$80 , P , $100 448 2.00 0.6492 1,924 214.57 0.0336
All 4,909 25.74 0.0886 10,995 27.85 0.0024
Positive $0 , P # $20 189 2.97 0.6880 1,649 22.80 0.2696
$20 , P # $40 436 216.25 0.0128 1,008 212.53 0.0095
$40 , P # $60 1,136 210.60 0.1601 752 25.32 0.5819
$60 , P # $80 1,603 26.58 0.2687 2,887 215.05 0.0587
$80 , P , $100 1,975 2.28 0.3580 3,656 29.76 0.0141
All 5,339 24.75 0.1214 9,952 29.66 0.0040
This table shows summary statistics describing 36,317 contract trades executed fewer than five minutes
after a touchdown occurs. Event type is defined to be negative (positive) if the touchdown makes the
contract less (more) likely to expire at $100. Events are classified into time periods based on when the score
occurred. Volume is the number of 10-contract lots traded in the five minute post-score period and Ticks to
Expiry is calculated by differencing expiry and execution prices. One tick is equal to $1. p-Value shows the
confidence level for rejecting the null hypothesis that Ticks to Expiry is not different from zero.
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otherwise. We adjust standard errors for the effects of clustering (Fuller,
1975).
Results for MSLS and Q1*Score show that information shocks play an
important role in prediction market price dynamics. The negative estimate for
MSLSmeans that those contracts purchased later (earlier)within the five-minute
post-score span are more (less) overpriced than otherwise. So, while the long-
term (t ¼ 5 to t ¼ 20) trends in Figures 7Aand 7B indicate that post-score prices
tend to drift downwards (towards underlying values), regression results show
that prices drift upwards (further away fromunderlyingvalues) in the short-term.
The coefficient estimates for thevariableQ1*Score indicate thatfirst-quarter
score direction is an important determinant of subsequent price movement.
Contracts purchased after negative scores dropmore in value compared to those
purchased following positive scores. The models employing price dummies
confirm that contracts purchased fewer than five minutes after news innovations
TABLE 2
Short-Term Post-Score Mispricing of NFL Contracts.
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Intercept 23.51 0.2120
MSLS 20.65 0.0004 20.63 0.0009 20.66 0.0006
Q1*Score 1.17 0.0002 0.87 0.0079 0.85 0.0093
Q2*Score 0.47 0.0706 0.33 0.2000 0.30 0.2552
Q3*Score 20.08 0.8138 20.13 0.7003 20.14 0.6869
Q4*Score 20.25 0.4350 20.20 0.5125 20.17 0.5700
Volume 20.70 0.0009 20.68 0.0009 20.68 0.0010
Price 0.04 0.4297
Price_0_20 1.04 0.6229
Price_20_40 27.04 0.0071
Price_40_60 25.81 0.0390
Price_60_80 1.83 0.4576
Price_80_100 1.03 0.6915
Price_0_10 3.07 0.1284
Price_10_20 21.35 0.5998
Price_20_30 25.61 0.0564
Price_30_40 28.14 0.0071
Price_40_50 25.73 0.0959
Price_50_60 25.83 0.0769
Price_60_70 22.32 0.4394
Price_70_80 7.70 0.0067
Price_80_90 3.34 0.2072
Price_90_100 20.93 0.7624
This OLS model examines 36,317 contract trades executed fewer than five minutes after a touchdown
occurs. The dependent variable is Ticks to Expiry, which is calculated by differencing the expiry price of
each contract and the price at which the transaction occurred. One tick is equal to $1.MSLS is the number of
minutes since the last score.Q1 (Q2,Q3,Q4) is a dummy variable set to 1 when the score occurs in quarter 1
(2, 3, 4), and to 0 otherwise, Score is the point value of the observed event [set to 26 (6) if the touchdown
makes the contract less (more) likely to expire at $100], and Volume is the natural log of the demeaned
number of 10-contract lots traded throughout the life of the contract. Each PRICE_X_Y variable is set to 1
whenever the execution price is greater than $X and less than or equal to $Y, and to 0 otherwise. We adjust
standard errors for the effects of clustering.
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while price is between $20 and $60 subsequently experience significant declines
in value.
Importantly, while prior research suggests that any differences between
prices and values should be symmetric around the market-price-midpoint of
$50, and that assets priced above $50 should be underpriced, the significant
estimates for PRICE_40_60 and PRICE_50_60 suggest otherwise in the short-
term. Results in Table 2 also consistently show that when volume is highest,
prices are most above underlying values. Our interpretation is that the most
public events attract the least sophisticated traders (or more unsophisticated
traders), thus supply suppression is particularly pronounced when popular
events underlie Tradesports contracts. This finding is consistent with the supply
suppressionhypothesis offeredearlier.9Thefinal portionof our analysis focuses
on the relatively long-term inefficiencies persisting after news innovations.
While asset prices deviate furthest fromunderlyingvalues in the fewminutes
immediately following information shocks, they also appear to remain
significantly biased for a substantial amount of time thereafter. Specifically,
the plots in Figure 7 suggest that in the 20-minute span after scores, prices tend to
drift downwards (mean Ticks to Expiry becomes less negative), but fail to reach
underlying values. Contracts bought during this period drop in price on average
by $6.38 prior to expiry, and this decline is reliably different from zero
(p-Value ¼ 0.0007). Those that are purchased after negative (positive) scores
dropby$9.22 ($3.94)onaverage, eachofwhich is also statistically different from
zero (p-Value,0.0001andp-Value ¼ 0.0596, respectively), as is thedifference
in means (p-Value ¼ 0.0002).
Earlier, when examining short-term price movements, it was reasonable to
adjust for time bydividing games into quarters.However, in studying longer time
frames, it may be more appropriate to account for time linearly. Figure 8, which
shows mean Ticks to Expiry within each 10-minute band prior to contract
expiration, suggests that the amount of time remaining until contract expiry may
be an important factor in explaining long-term variations in post-score price
movements.10
OLS regression results presented in Table 3 provide confirmation that
information shocks influence the magnitude of price biases in this market.
Even after accounting for time to expiry, volume, and price, contracts bought
less than 20 minutes after scores lose $4.58 on average from execution to
expiry. One possibility is that during this time, while many market participants
are eager to trade (as suggested by the relatively high transaction volume
around t ¼ 0 in Figure 7), ask prices generally exceed underlying values. We
propose that unsophisticated traders in this market are apprehensive about
selling and, when underlying events are active, the resulting supply shortage
causes asset prices to become persistently inflated. Before underlying events
begin, however, sophisticated traders have a sufficient opportunity to exploit
any such biases, so the inefficient behavior of novices does not force a
sustained divergence between prices and values. The Volume coefficient,
which demonstrates that popular assets are more overpriced, is consistent with
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results from prior specifications and further supports the supply suppression
hypothesis.
The estimates for MSLS and Score are also significant. The former
estimate confirms that contract overpricing becomes less pronounced with
time throughout the 20-minute post-score period, while the latter indicates
that contracts bought following negative scores subsequently lose more value
than those bought after positive scores. The positive sign of the Score estimate
is consistent with the proposition that Tradesports participants dislike selling
in general, and provides evidence that they may prefer to hold (rather than
sell) contracts that have recently lost value. However, this effect is diminished
once we account for non-linearities in the relationship between price and Ticks
to Expiry. Using dummy variables, we again find that assets priced between
$20 and $60 lose the most value after scores. After discretely correcting for
price, both MSLS and Volume remain important determinants of post-score
price movement.
To further test the relationship between purchase prices and subsequent
losses, we also divide contracts into 10 price bands (column 3). Results are
consistent with those from the five-price-band model, and the significant
coefficient estimate forPrice_50_60 provides further support for two potentially
interesting findings. First, imbalances between supply and demand are not
symmetric around the market-price-midpoint of $50. Second, while the utility
maximization model predicts that assets priced above $50 are undervalued, we
observe that the opposite is true within a relatively wide price range. These
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FIGURE 8. NFL contract price movements by minutes to expiry. This plot is generated from 209,052 NFL
contract trades occurring after kickoff. Each data point represents the observed mean Ticks to Expiry of
contracts purchased while fewer than 180 minutes remain until expiry (grouped into 10-minute bands). One
tick is equal to $1. Ticks to Expiry is calculated by differencing expiry and execution prices. Error bars
indicate 95% confidence limits after adjusting standard errors for the effects of clustering. The dashed curve
indicates volume expressed as the number of 10-contract lots traded within each time band.
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results, in conjunction with earlier evidence showing that assets are overpriced
in aggregate, suggest that this particular exchange, andpossiblyothers like it,may
be dominated by unsophisticated traders who unwittingly suppress asset supply.
We next explore the possibility that our findings can be used to implement an
abnormally profitable within-game short-selling strategy.
C. Trading strategy
One obvious profit-seeking approach would be to exploit the anticipated
value decline of assets within the price range $20 to $60. For instance, we find
that the mean expiry price for all contracts purchased within the price band
$27.50 ^ $1.25 is $16.91 (N ¼ 3,110). The return rate of a strategy that sells
contracts in this range and buys them back at expiry is 13.43% after
accounting for round-trip trading fees.11 Even if the realized rate at which
such contracts expire at $100 were two standard errors above the mean, a
trader would expect to earn a 5.12% profit over the course of just a few hours.
TABLE 3
Long-term post-score mispricing of NFL contracts.
Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value Estimate p-Value
Intercept 24.58 0.0656
MSLS 0.15 0.0466 0.16 0.0342 0.16 0.0408
MRUE 20.04 0.0364 20.02 0.3374 20.02 0.4214
Score 0.34 0.0241 0.24 0.1087 0.24 0.1252
Volume 20.49 0.0161 20.49 0.0144 20.49 0.0138
Price 0.05 0.2100
Price_0_20 20.83 0.6689
Price_20_40 28.36 0.0079
Price_40_60 29.24 0.0073
Price_60_80 1.46 0.6722
Price_80_100 20.22 0.9382
Price_0_10 0.53 0.7575
Price_10_20 22.60 0.3864
Price_20_30 27.79 0.0141
Price_30_40 29.10 0.0149
Price_40_50 29.17 0.0157
Price_50_60 29.67 0.0138
Price_60_70 21.89 0.6234
Price_70_80 5.20 0.1469
Price_80_90 1.26 0.7022
Price_90_100 21.71 0.5161
This OLS model examines 105,737 contract trades executed fewer than 20 minutes after a touchdown
occurs. The dependent variable is Ticks to Expiry, which is calculated by differencing the expiry price of
each contract and the price at which the transaction occurred. One tick is equal to $1.MSLS is the number of
minutes since the last score,MRUE is the number of minutes remaining until expiry, Score is the point value
of the observed event [set to 26 (6) if the touchdown makes the contract less (more) likely to expire at
$100], and Volume is the natural log of the demeaned number of 10-contract lots traded throughout the life
of the contract. Each PRICE_X_Y variable is set to 1 whenever the execution price is greater than $X and
less than or equal to $Y, and to 0 otherwise. We adjust standard errors for the effects of clustering
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Perhaps more interestingly, it would also be possible to exploit the market
without conditioning on price, instead taking advantage of the combined
effects of aggregate supply suppression and contract misvaluation after news
innovations. Our proposed trading strategy is as follows. Following a negative
(positive) score, we sell one contract at a price equal to that of the first
transaction occurring at least one (two) minute(s) after the score, as long as that
trade did not occur longer than two (three) minutes after the score. We choose
these particular one-minute periods to be conservative, as our assumed selling
prices are less desirable than those available immediately after scores.12
We also measure the effects imposing of one of two liquidity constraints.
The more conservative Restriction 1 requires that we sell a contract only if it
has traded in each of the 10 one-minute spans prior to the score. Restriction 2
is less stringent, and requires that we sell only when a contract has traded in at
least five of the 10 one-minute spans before the score occurs. All assets sold
using either strategy are held to expiry.
Under Restriction 1, we sell 72 (85) contracts approximately one (two)
minute(s) after negative (positive) events.MeanTicks toExpiry for this portfolio
after round-trip transactions costs is 210.23, with a standard error of 3.99.
The mean selling (expiry) price is $47.97 ($36.94), and the strategy produces a
19.51% rate of return. As an additional check to determine whether limited
market depth would prohibit implementation, we measure the frequency at
which our contracts trade during the one-minute span in which we sell. We find
that market participants execute 1,086 trades of the 157 contracts that we target
for our portfolio, and thevalue of these trades totals $84,092.Thus,market depth
does not appear to prohibit the strategy when employing Restriction 1.
Using Restriction 2, we sell 516 (600) contracts one (two) minute(s) after
each negative (positive) event, and the mean (standard error) Ticks to Expiry
for this portfolio is 26.42 (2.23). The mean selling (expiry) price is $53.73
($46.51), and the rate of return is 13.76%. During the one-minute span in
which we sell, the targeted contracts trade 4,719 times and the combined value
of these trades is $383,217.13 Again, market depth would not severely limit
the implementation of our strategy.
While it would be useful to quantify the effect of the bid-ask spread on
profitability, the required data are unavailable. However, because our strategy
restricts trading to those times in which the market is particularly liquid, this
issue is unlikely to invalidate our conclusions. Furthermore, because contract
prices experience larger declines after negative scores and also within lower
price bands, a trader could earn a higher rate of return were she to impose a
restriction to sell only if these two conditions were met.
D. Future research
The sports exchange examined here typically lists only one asset per
event, so participants who believe that an asset is overpriced must sell to
capitalize.14 If there is a shortage of willing sellers, then assets prices can
persistently exceed underlying values while events are active. However, an
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alternative asset structure could mitigate this potential problem. When there is
one asset per state, within-exchange arbitrage is possible. For instance,
in election markets, an agent may buy a contract with payout dependent upon
whether candidate A wins a political seat over candidates B, C, and D. If she
believes that contract A is overpriced, she can sell A and buy B, C, and
D. Thus, if the supply of A is suppressed, then a within-exchange arbitrage
operation can correct any shortfalls in its supply.
This idea may be meaningful when designing contracts to be listed on
internal corporate prediction markets. In that setting, the ultimate goal is to
obtain precise forecasts of business events. So, it may be preferable to
construct assets in a way that facilitates within-exchange arbitrage.
Tradesports does offer a set of football contracts for which arbitrage may
be possible. For example, the exchange lists contracts for each of the 32 NFL
franchises to win the Super Bowl. One potentially fruitful line of research may
be to compare the predictive accuracy of event-based contracts to that of state-
based assets in the Tradesports market.
IV. CONCLUSION
Financial economists have long studied information processing in
traditional casino-type sports betting markets. Here we analyze a relatively
new form of sports betting, the within-game financial-market-style of betting
conducted on Tradesports.com. In several respects, this setting is well-suited
as an alternative domain in which to examine how markets react to new
information and to study the effects of contract framing on trader behavior.
We begin with the observation that the prices of NFL contracts are not
systematically biased prior to kickoff, a time period in which little new
information is flowing and inwhich arbitrageurs can easily trade acrossmarkets.
After kickoff, major news events occur (in the form of within-game scores), and
traders update their prior estimates of contract value accordingly. However, we
find evidence suggesting that unsophisticatedNFLbettors avoid selling, and thus
force asset prices to rise above underlying values on average. This deviation
between contract prices and values is most pronounced immediately after
information shocksarrive, especiallywhen the incomingnews isnegative.While
underlying events are active, arbitrage operations are problematic, contracts
remain persistently overpriced, and one could profitably exploit the bias by
selling contracts shortly after scores.
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NOTES
1. A ‘win’ is defined to be expiry at $100.
2. In a sides (totals) wager, gamblers bet on the difference in (sum of) the number of points that opposing
teams will score. An example of a Tradesports NFL sides contract listing is ‘NFL.WAS@SFN.WAS-
2.5.’ The exchange usually lists multiple sides contracts and a single totals contract for each game.
In our analysis, we include (exclude) all sides (totals) contracts.
3. We adjust throughout at the contract level. Adjusting instead at the game level does not materially alter
results.
4. For instance, the injury status of key players is sometimes revealed several days before kickoff.
5. Prior research suggests that bettors who wager on football are relatively unsophisticated compared with
those who wager on other sports (Woodland and Woodland, 1999).
6. We omit field goals from the analysis because they are difficult to interpret; they partly represent bad
news because the realization is that a touchdown will not be scored. We also omit extra points from the
analysis, thus all scores have an absolute value of six.
7. We do not look past 20 minutes for several reasons. First, we are concerned primarily with mispricing
shortly after scores because we later propose a trading strategy that sells contracts at t ¼ 1 or t ¼ 2
minutes after such events. Second, as t increases beyond 0, a greater proportion of contracts are affected
by subsequent scoring, so Ticks to Expiry becomes a less reliable measure of mispricing caused by an
earlier event. It is also problematic to examine contract price movements only for those events that are
not followed by another score because such circumstances occur almost exclusively near contract
expiry. And, as we later demonstrate, the amount of time remaining until expiry is potentially an
important determinant of Ticks to Expiry.
8. We calculate the total number of units traded throughout the lifetime of each contract, subtract
the mean number of units traded per contract across the entire sample, and then take the natural
log.
9. On the other hand, Tetlock (2004) finds no difference in returns between featured sports events (those
receiving the most television network coverage) and non-featured sports events nor between high- and
low-volume contracts. However, the data in that study are gathered by taking price snapshots at 30-
minute intervals, thus nearly all observations come from the inactive period.
10. We exclude from this plot all trades made while more than 180 minutes remain to expiry. Games that
go into overtime typically last longer than three hours and are more likely to result in an underdog
beating the spread than otherwise. Because all events are framed with respect to favorites, contracts
with more than 180 minutes remaining to expiry expire at $0 more often than expected ex-ante.
11. $27.50 – ($16.91 þ $0.40) – $0.40]/($72.50 þ $0.40)
12. Refer to Figures 7A and 7B.
13. The potential dollar value of an implemented strategy would be substantial because the figures above
account only for executed trades, and bid volume at slightly less favorable prices is typically large.
In addition, each strategy would be effective for longer than just the one-minute spans examined above.
14. An ‘event’ in this context is defined as a particular sides line.
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